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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

Plaintiff/Respondent
vs.

Case No. 880469-CA

DONALD L. BEE
Defendant/Appellant. :

Brief of Respondent

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OP PROCEEDINGS BELOW
1.

Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Court of

Appeals to hear this appeal by Utah Code Ann. 78-2a-3(b) 1953, as
amended.

STATEMENT OP ISSUES
I.
Exhibit

Whether the trial judge properly admitted State's

If

C", and whether it was proper to allow the jury to

consider the results of an intoxilyzer test that was given.
II.

Whether the trial judge properly instructed the

jury on the time frame in which an intoxilyzer test must be given
and whether that instruction contained an unconstitutional
presumption.
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STATEMENT OP THE CASE

This is an appeal from a conviction for driving under
the influence of alcohol.

The case was tried before a jury on

the 6th day of May, 1988 and the defendant was found guilty.

The

defendant was sentenced on the 25th day of May, 1988 and on the
3rd day of June, 1988, a motion for new trial was filed by the
defendant.

This motion was denied and on the 29th day of July,

1988, a Notice of Appeal was filed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent does not dispute the facts as set forth in
Appellant's brief except that the State would put forth that no
objection was raised as to Instruction No. 8.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

That the State's Exhibits "B", "C", and "D" were

properly accepted into evidence and submitted to the Jury.

Each

of these exhibits met the foundational requirements to be
admitted and any interpretation of that evidence was a question
for the Jury.
2.

That Appellant failed to object to Instruction No.

8 at the trial level, and even if there had been an objection,
the instruction does not set forth any unconstitutional
presumptions that would warrant a reversal of the case.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE INTRODUCTION OF THE BREATH TEST GIVEN TO THE
DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO THE JURY

As indicated in Appellant's brief, Appellant was
charged by information with Driving While Under the Influence of
Alcohol and/or Drugs. As part of the investigation, Appellant
was given an intoxilyzer test to determine the alcohol content of
his blood.
When an intoxilyzer test is used, Utah Code Annotated
Section 41-6-44.3 sets out the standards which must be followed
in order for the test to be introduced at trial.

In the present

case, the officer who gave the test to Appellant testified that
(1) he had been trained and certified in the use of the
intoxilyzer machine, (2) he followed each and every step in
administering the test as he has been trained to do, (3) he
inserted the intoxilyzer test record as required, and (4) it
printed out the results on that test record (T.79 - 88)
The issue then became what the results printed on that
test recorded meant.

The State offered exhibit "D" which was the

intoxilyzer test affidavit.

There was no question that the

machine used to give Appellant the test was the same machine that
was the subject of the test affidavit.
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A review of the affidavit shows that the machine used
to test Appellant gives readings in grams of alcohol per 210
liters of breath.

Therefore, when Appellant was tested, the

machine used to test Appellant was measuring grams of alcohol per
210 liters in Appellant's breath.

Therefore, the exhibits

introduced by the State fully meet the requirements of Utah Code
Annotated 41-6-44.3, and the Court did not error in allowing
those exhibits into evidence.
It is a long held tradition that it is the trier of
fact that determines the credibility or non-credibility of any
witness or any evidence that is offered.

Once the results of the

intoxilyzer test was introduced to the Jury, it was their right
and duty to determine what weight, if any, they would give that
evidence.
If the information and jury instruction required the
Jury find that Appellant had a blood alcohol content of greater
than .08%, and the evidence produced by the State showed that the
Appellant had a breath alcohol content rather than blood alcohol
content, it was up to the Jury to decide whether the State has
met it's burden or not . The Jury is free to accept or reject
all or any part of the evidence submitted by the State.
Therefore, so long as the exhibits and evidence
submitted by the State meets the foundational requirements as set
out by statutes, they can be submitted to the jury.

It is then

the jury's duty to determine how those exhibits should be
interpreted.
7

Finally, even if the Court were to find that the
exhibits were improperly submitted, the State would point out
that there was more than enough other reliable evidence on which
the jury could have found the Appellant guilty,
POINT II
APPELLANT FAILED TO OBJECT TO THE INSTRUCTION
AT THE TIME OF TRIAL AND THE INSTRUCTION DOES
NOT SET OUT AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION.

In response to Appellant's second point on appeal, the
State would point out that no objection was lodged to the
instruction either at the time it was proposed or at the time it
was read to the jury.

Further, no motion for mistrial was made

after the instruction was read.
Contrary to Appellant's statement that he was not given
an opportunity to object to the instruction, the State would
point out that during the course of the trial, Appellant moved
the Court to dismiss two of the original counts.

That motion was

granted (T.167) and after granting that motion the Judge
indicated that new instructions would be prepared (T.168).
New instructions were prepared and submitted to both
the Defense and the Prosecution.
instruction to the jury.

The Judge read these

Therefore, Appellant had at least two

opportunities to object to the instruction: when new instructions
were made, and when they were read to the Jury.
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Even accepting arguendo that this issue is properly
before the Court, the State would argue that the presumption set
forth in the instruction does not rise to the level of violating
Appellants due process rights.
The instruction merely sets forth a presumption that if
a chemical test was given within two hours of the driving, then
the blood alcohol level shown by the test is presumed to be the
same level as at the time of the actual driving.

This

instruction merely sets forth the natural fact that it takes a
certain amount of time for alcohol levels in the blood to be
metabolized out.

Therefore, after a two hour period,

very little alcohol will have been metabolized out of the
suspects system and the test level will not be significantly
affected.
Further, there is no presumption of correctness set
forth in this instruction.

The Jury must still decide whether

the machine was operating correctly, whether the operator
followed the proper steps in administering the test, and several
other factors before they can conclude that the defendant is
guilty.
If the instruction had stated in effect that had the
test been given within two hours of the driving, then the jury is
to presume that either the defendant is guilty or the test is
accurate and they need not deliberate any further; that then
would be an unconstitutional presumption.
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Finally, even if this instruction is found to have been
given improperly, it is harmless error in that there is more than
sufficient evidence for the jury to have found the Appellant
guilty.
CONCLUSION
The trial court did not error in allowing Exhibit "C"
to be admitted into evidence, or to allow Instruction No. 8 to be
given.

Neither of these issues were major and there was more

than sufficient evidence to convict the appellant of driving
under the influence of alcohol.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

?/

day of May 1989.

Spz&fcnTv. Major
/f
Attorney for Plaiivciff/Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that on the

J?/

day of May, 1989,

a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of was mailed with
postage prepaid thereon, to the following:

D. Bruce Oliver
Diumenti & Lindsley
505 South Main Street
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM
i * "• J flection

*i -^- * - ,

:

rne commissioner wx L;-^ department cf Pub • <: ••-*
Safety shall establish standards for tn.€
administration and interpretation of chemical
analysis of a person'- v ^ a t h . including standards
of training.
In any action cr pre. wni^r, it ; s
material to prove that a person was operating or
in actual physical control of a vehicle while
under the influence of alcohol or any drug or
operating with a blood or breath alcohol content
statutorily prohibited, documents offered as
memoranda or records of acts, conditions, or
events to prove that the analysis was made and the
instrument used was accurate, according to
standards established in Subsectior fis
^re
admissible if:
a. the judge finds Lnat they *.«ero. r. •*
:_:;*regular course of the investigation at cr
about the time of the " -*" ---.rn^H* :- -v- ^r
event; and
b. the source of information rrom wnich uidae
and the method and circumsti^^^ --? th^j r
preparation indicate their
trustworthiness.
If the judge finds that the standards establ. ---d
under Subsection fl) and the conditions of
Subsection (2) have been met, there is a
presumption that the test results are valid «
further foundation for introduction of the
evidence is unnecessary.

